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Abstract
We present a model of optimal contracting between a purchaser and a provider of
health services when quality has two dimensions. We assume that one dimension of
quality is veri￿able (dimension 1) and one dimension is not veri￿able (dimension 2).
We show that the power of the incentive scheme for the veri￿able dimension depends
critically on the extent to which quality 1 increases or decreases the provider￿ s marginal
disutility and the patients￿marginal bene￿t from quality 2 (i.e. substitutability or
complementarity). Our main result is that under some circumstances a high-powered
incentive scheme can be optimal even when the two quality dimensions are substitutes.
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11 Introduction
Policymakers aim to design incentive schemes that encourage better performance in the
health care sector. This is often referred to as Paying for Performance. For example,
the Medicare Programme in the United States provides higher transfers to hospitals that
perform well according to measurable quality indicators, such as rates of cervical cancer
screening and hemoglobin testing for diabetic patients (Rosenthal et al., 2005). In the
United Kingdom general practitioners who perform well on certain quality indicators,
such as the measurement of blood pressure and cholesterol in patients with ischemic heart
disease, can receive substantial ￿nancial rewards. These can amount to about 20% of a
general-practitioner￿ s budget (Doran et al., 2006). Rosenthal et al. (2004) provide 36 other
examples of Pay-for-Performance programs in the United States. Similar initiatives are
being discussed in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the Netherlands and Spain (Gravelle,
Sutton and Ma, 2008).
The Pay for Performance (P4P) programs outlined above de￿ne quality in such a
way that it is veri￿able. That is, the reimbursement contract between the payer and the
provider must be written such that quality indicators can be observed and veri￿ed ex post
by a third party (e.g. by court). However, a major issue in rewarding performance is
that while some quality dimensions are veri￿able through performances indicators, other
dimensions of quality are not. For example, both communication about medical conditions,
and hemoglobin testing a⁄ect the quality of care for diabetic patients. While the latter
dimension can be veri￿ed by a third party, the former dimension is not. Another example
can be found in the P4P-program Quality and Outcome Framework (QOF) introduced for
UK general practices in 2004 (Gravelle, Sutton and Ma, 2008). While diagnosis factors
like blood pressure, body mass index and smoking status are incentivised for diabetes
patients (and hence are veri￿able), alcohol consumption is not. It is well known from the
contract literature that problems of non-veri￿ability and multi-tasking may impose severe
di¢ culties in e⁄ective incentive design (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991; Baker 1992).
Recently, Eggleston (2005) has provided a model with two quality dimensions. She
2shows that if one dimension of quality is veri￿able, while one dimension of quality is not,
then the introduction of a P4P-program may increase the veri￿able quality dimension,
which will increase patients￿bene￿t, but may decrease the non-veri￿able one, which will
reduce patients￿bene￿t. The overall welfare e⁄ect is therefore ambiguous. The purpose of
this study is to investigate two related questions: 1) under what conditions is it desirable
to introduce a Pay-for-Performance incentive scheme? 2) If the introduction is desirable,
how strong should be the power of the optimal incentive scheme?
We show that the optimal incentive scheme depends critically on the extent to which
quality 1 (the veri￿able dimension) increases or decreases providers￿marginal disutility and
patients￿marginal bene￿t of quality 2 (the non-veri￿able one), i.e. the extent to which
quality 1 and 2 are substitutes or complements. Quality dimensions can be substitutes
when they are time consuming for the doctor or the provider, so that an increase in
one dimension of quality tends to reduce the other dimension. Quality dimensions can be
complements in the presence of scope economies or learning by doing: if induced to increase
quality in one dimension, the provider becomes better at providing the other dimension as
well. The Quality and Outcome Framework program in the UK illustrates other examples
of cases where quality dimensions may be susbstitutes and complements. This program
mainly focused on the care of people with ten targeted chronic conditions. In a survey
with a random national sample of GPs in England conducted before the introduction of
the P4P-contract, nearly one-third of the GPs thought that care for patients with acute
conditions would deteriorate as a result of the increase in quality for chronic conditions
(i.e. these quality dimensions are substitutes; Whalley et al., 2008).1 Sutton et al. (2008)
estimate the possible spillovers from veri￿able to non-veri￿able quality dimensions in the
QOF-contract by analyzing annual rates of recording of clinical e⁄ective factors (blood
pressure, cholesterol, alcohol consumption, etc.) from 315 general practices over the period
2000-2006. They ￿nd that, following the introduction of the QOF, the recording of non-
veri￿able, clinically-e⁄ective factors for the targeted groups increased by 10.9 percentage
1In a follow-up survey conducted after the introduction of QOF, GPs were less likely to believe that
the contract had decreased quality of care for patients with acute disease (Whalley et al, 2008)
3points (i.e. quality dimensions are complements).
We might intuitively expect that the incentive scheme will be low powered when quality
dimensions are substitutes. This intuition holds true in some circumstances. However, we
show that in some cases the optimal incentive scheme can instead be high-powered even
when the two quality dimensions are substitutes. Moreover, in other cases it may well
arise that the incentive scheme breaks down.
In more detail, we show that if the two quality dimensions are substitutes, three possible
solutions arise. 1) The incentive scheme breaks down: it is not optimal to introduce Pay
for Performance as the gain of welfare from an increase in quality dimension 1 is lower than
the loss of welfare from a reduction in quality dimension 2. This result arises when the
bene￿ts from the quality dimension that is not veri￿able are relatively more important.
2) The optimal incentive scheme is low powered: the price for the veri￿able quality 1 is
below the marginal bene￿t of quality 1. Both quality dimensions are positive. This result
arises when the bene￿ts from the quality dimension that is veri￿able are relatively more
important but need to be traded o⁄ with the reductions in the quality dimension that is
not veri￿able.
3) The optimal incentive scheme is high powered: the price for the veri￿able quality 1 is
equal to the marginal bene￿t of quality dimension 1 and the optimal quality in dimension
2 is zero. This result arises when the quality dimension that is not veri￿able falls quickly to
the minimum when the price is raised, while the bene￿ts from the quality dimension that
is veri￿able are large. This is, to some extent, a surprising result, as we would intuitively
expect the incentive scheme to have low power when quality dimensions are substitutes.
If the two quality dimensions are complements, the incentive scheme is always high
powered. The price for the veri￿able quality 1 is above the marginal bene￿t of quality
dimension 1. Both quality dimensions are positive.
We also compare our solutions with what can be obtained if both dimensions of quality
are veri￿able and the optimal prices are implemented. Obviously, the second-best quality,
when quality dimension 2 is not veri￿able, is generally di⁄erent from the ￿rst-best quality,
4when quality dimension 2 is also veri￿able, however not necessarily lower. Second-best
veri￿able quality may be higher in second best if the two dimensions of quality are com-
plements. This follows since providing incentives for the veri￿able quality is an indirect
way of incentivising the non-veri￿able quality.
This study contributes to the literature on provider incentives in health care. Despite
the increase in the use of performance indicators, most of the existing theoretical literature
assumes that quality is not veri￿able (for example Pope, 1989; Ma, 1994; Rogerson, 1994;
Ellis, 1998; Ellis and McGuire, 1990; Chalkley and Malcomson, 1998a and 1998b; Mougeot
and Naegelen, 2005). As quality indicators become increasingly available, quality becomes
partially veri￿able. Therefore, there is increasing scope for analysing incentive schemes
within this imperfect environment. As far as the authors are aware, this is one of the ￿rst
attempts to derive the optimal incentive scheme when such indicators are available within
the healthcare sector.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the main assumptions of the
model and derives the equilibrium price when only one dimension of quality is veri￿able.
Section 3 provides comparative statics with respect to the price. Sections 4 derives the
￿rst-best solution, when both dimensions of quality are veri￿able, and compares it with
the second-best solution derived in section 2. Section 5 discusses possible extensions of
the model. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
There are two active players, the sponsor (the payer or a purchaser of health services) and
the provider (a hospital or a family doctor). The sponsor provides reimbursement to the
provider, and the provider exerts e⁄ort on two quality tasks. In addition, fully insured
patients, whose bene￿t is increasing in the quality provided on both tasks, seek treatment
to the provider. The model is solved by backwards induction, starting with the provider￿ s
choice of quality levels.
52.1 The provider
There are two dimensions of quality, q1 and q2: The disutility from exerting quality e⁄ort
q1 and q2 is ￿(q1;q2). The disutility is increasing in quality and strictly convex: ￿qi > 0,
￿qiqi > 0, where ￿qi := @￿i=@qi and ￿qiqi := @2￿i=@q2
i for i = 1;2. If the two dimensions
of quality are substitutes, then an increase in quality 1 increases the marginal disutility
of quality 2 and ￿q2q1 > 0. If they are complements, an increase in quality 1 reduces the






Patients￿bene￿t from receiving quality q1 and q2 is B(q1;q2) with Bqi > 0, and Bqiqi ￿
0, i = 1;2: Patients￿bene￿t increases with quality and is concave. If Bq1q2 = 0 then the two
dimensions of quality are independent. If Bq1q2 < 0 then an increase in quality 1 decreases
the marginal bene￿t of quality 2, and the two dimensions of quality are substitutes. If
Bq1q2 > 0 then an increase in quality 1 increases the marginal bene￿t of quality 2, and
the two dimensions of quality are complements. We will consider all these three cases,
although the presence of complementarity in quality seems more plausible. To simplify
the exposition and without loss of generality, we assume that the third-order derivatives





The incentive scheme is based only on the veri￿able dimension of quality q1. That is,
we assume that no contract on q2 can be enforced: it is prohibitively costly to specify this
outcome ex ante in such a way that it can be veri￿ed by a court ex post. Therefore, the
payment (price or bonus) can be based only on q1 and not q2. The payment for each unit
of veri￿able quality q1 is p ￿ 0. Below we will refer to p as the price. The provider also
receives a lump-sum payment T ￿ 0:2
The provider is semi altruistic (see Ellis and McGuire, 1986; Chalkley and Malcomson,
1998a; Eggleston, 2005; Jack, 2005). Altruism is captured by the parameter ￿ ￿ 0.
2For realism we consider linear contracts. This is without loss of generality as the optimal solution
derived in section 3 can also be implemented by a non-linear contract or a contract which speci￿es a ￿xed
transfer conditional on a certain amount of veri￿able quality.
6Provider￿ s utility from providing quality q1 and q2 to a representative patient is
U = T + pq1 + ￿B(q1;q2) ￿ ￿(q1;q2) (1)
subject to q1 ￿ 0, q2 ￿ 0. Suppose that both quality dimensions are positive in equilibrium
(q1 > 0, q2 > 0). Then the optimal levels of quality provided by the provider are given by
the following First Order Conditions (FOCs):
p + ￿Bq1(q1;q2) = ￿q1(q1;q2) (2)
￿Bq2(q1;q2) = ￿q2(q1;q2) (3)
The optimal quality for dimension 1 is determined such that the marginal bene￿t from
the price plus the altruistic component are equal to the marginal disutility of providing
quality. The optimal quality for dimension 2 is determined such that the marginal bene￿t
from the altruistic component is equal to the marginal disutility.
In the Appendix we show that the Second Order Conditions (SOCs) are satis￿ed and
Uq1q1Uq2q2 ￿ U2















A higher price always increases quality dimension 1 (@q1=@p > 0). This follows since
a higher price increases the provider￿ s marginal bene￿t of providing the veri￿able quality.
He therefore responds by increasing q1:
The e⁄ect of an increase in price on the non-veri￿able quality q2 depends on whether the
two quality dimensions are substitutes, independent or complements in patients￿bene￿ts
and provider￿ s disutility.
De￿nition 1 The two quality dimensions are substitutes in patients￿bene￿t and in provider￿ s




< 0. The two quality dimen-
sions are independent if the patient￿ s bene￿t and provider￿ s disutility function is separable




= 0. The two
quality dimensions are complements in patients￿bene￿t and in provider￿ s disutility when





From equation (4) it follows that an increase in price decreases quality dimension
2 when the two quality dimensions are substitutes in patients￿bene￿t and in provider￿ s
disutility. A higher price increases quality 2 if the two quality dimensions are complements
in patient￿ s bene￿t and in provider￿ s disutility. In this case introducing a positive price is
clearly welfare improving for the patients (compared to no price) although there is still an
issue of how to set the optimal price. If patients￿bene￿t and provider￿ s disutility function
is separable in the two quality dimensions then a higher price has no e⁄ect on quality





determines the relationship between the quality dimensions: if the two quality dimensions
are complements in patients￿bene￿t but are substitutes in provider￿ s disutility function,
then the overall e⁄ect will depend on the relative strength of the two e⁄ects. As a special





Finally, if the constraint q2 ￿ 0 is binding with strict equality (which arises when
￿Bq2 ￿ ￿q2 < 0), then the FOC for quality 1 is:
p + ￿Bq1(q1;q2 = 0) = ￿q1(q1;q2 = 0) (5)
and @q1=@p = 1=(￿Uq1q1) > 0. Notice that for any positive level of the price p, the non-
negativity constraint for quality 1 is never binding in equilibrium as quality 1 is always
positive (q1 > 0). This is not the case for quality 2 which can reach zero for su¢ ciently
high price p; when the two quality dimensions are substitutes.
2.2 The purchaser
The purchaser maximises the di⁄erence between patients￿bene￿t and the transfers to the
provider B(q1;q2) ￿ T ￿ pq1 subject to the participation constraint: U ￿ 0 or T + pq1 ￿
8￿(q1;q2) ￿ ￿B(q1;q2).3 Since this is binding with equality, the problem becomes:
max
p￿0
W = (1 + ￿)B(q1(p);q2(p)) ￿ ￿(q1(p);q2(p)) (6)
subject to:
p + ￿Bq1(q1;q2) ￿ ￿q1(q1;q2) ￿ 0; q1 ￿ 0; (7)
￿Bq2(q1;q2) ￿ ￿q2(q1;q2) ￿ 0; q2 ￿ 0; (8)
where the inequalities in the incentive￿ compatibility constraints hold with complementary
slackness. The question is: will a strictly positive price increase the purchaser￿ s utility?
The trade-o⁄ is that a higher price increases quality in dimension 1 and therefore welfare,
but might also reduce quality in dimension 2, which reduces welfare.
The First Order Condition with respect to price, if an interior solution exists (i.e.
q2 ￿ 0 is not binding with strict equality), is:4
dW(q1(p);q2(p))
dp
= [(1 + ￿)Bq1 ￿ ￿q1](@q1=@p) + [(1 + ￿)Bq2 ￿ ￿q2](@q2=@p) = 0 (9)
Using the provider￿ s FOCs (￿Bq1 ￿ ￿q1 = ￿p), the optimal price is given by




The optimal price is set equal to the marginal bene￿t of quality 1 adjusted for the the ratio
of the responsiveness of the two quality dimensions to price times the marginal bene￿t
of quality 2. From this it follows that the optimal price will be below, equal or above
3We could assume instead that the purchaser maximises a utilitarian welfare function. De￿ne ￿ as the
opportunity cost of public funds. Then a utilitarian welfare function is given by B￿(1 + ￿)(T + pq1)+U,
which after substituting for U = 0 and setting T + pq1 = ￿ ￿ ￿B, provides B(1 + ￿ + ￿￿) ￿ (1 + ￿)￿.
This formulation is similar to Boadway, Marchand and Sato (2004). Chalkley and Malcomson (1998a)
argue that this formulation leads to double counting of the altruistic component, and that the altruistic
component into the welfare function should be excluded. If this approach is followed instead, then the
welfare function is: B(1+￿￿)￿(1 + ￿)￿. These alternative formulations would not qualitative impact on
our main results.
4In the Appendix we show that the SOC is satis￿ed and the problem is well behaved.
9the marginal bene￿t of quality 1 depending on whether the two quality dimensions are
substitutes, independent or complements in patients￿bene￿ts and provider￿ s disutility. If
the two dimensions are substitutes then the optimal price is below the marginal bene￿t of
quality 1: p￿ < Bq1 (q1(p￿);q2(p￿)). If a higher price has no e⁄ect on quality 2 (i.e the two
dimensions are independent), then the price is equal to the marginal bene￿t of quality 1:
p￿ = Bq1 (q1(p￿);q2). Finally, if the two dimensions are complements, then the price is set
above the marginal bene￿t of quality 1: p￿ > Bq1 (q1(p￿);q2(p￿)).
If the optimal price is above or equal to the marginal bene￿t of quality 1, p￿ ￿ Bq1, we
call the incentives high-powered. Similarly, if p￿ < Bq1; then the incentives are low-powered.
Notice that if the two dimensions are substitutes, then there is always a level of price
p = p such that the level of quality 2 hits zero. In other words, since quality 2 is decreasing
in price, there has to be a price high enough to bring quality 2 to zero (the minimum level







= [(1 + ￿)Bq1 ￿ ￿q1](@q1=@p) ? 0: (11)
The point is that when quality 2 is zero and price is above p, then a marginal increase in
price can be welfare improving (reducing) if the marginal bene￿t from quality 1 is larger
(smaller) than the marginal disutility.
De￿ne psb as the price under the second-best solution. We de￿ne this price second best
because one dimension of quality is not veri￿able. In section 4 we derive the optimal price
under the ￿rst best, i.e. when the two dimensions of quality are veri￿able.
The following Propositions 1-4 identify the conditions under which the power of the
incentive scheme is respectively zero, positive but low, and high. We ￿rst investigate the
case when it is optimal for the purchaser to set the price equal to zero. In these situations,
even if it is possible for the purchaser to write contracts on some dimensions of quality,
she prefers not to. Intuitively, this case arises when quality dimension 2 is relatively
more important for the sponsor, and when a positive price shifts the provider￿ s choice of
quality production towards the ￿rst task. The following Proposition 1 provides a su¢ cient
10condition for having no incentive scheme, i.e. for setting psb = 0.












> 0; (ii) dW(q1(p);q2(p) = 0)=dpjp=p < 0. Then, dW(p = 0)=dp <
0 and psb = 0. The incentive scheme breaks down.
Proof. Appendix. ￿
Condition i) in Proposition 1 suggests that quality 2 is relatively more important than
quality 1. However, notice that for this condition to hold it is not enough having the
marginal bene￿t of quality 1 smaller than the marginal bene￿t of quality 2 at p = 0. The





be su¢ ciently high. If this condition is not met, then the results in Proposition 2 below
apply. Condition ii) guarantees that at p = p (the price required to bring quality 2 to zero)
the marginal gain from quality 1 is below its marginal disutility, and an additional increase
in price would reduce welfare. Figure 1.a illustrates the solution.5 The solid line provides
the welfare when both quality dimensions are allowed to vary, and the dotted line the
welfare when quality 2 is set to zero. The two lines cross at p = p. It is straightforward to
verify that the optimal price p￿ is in this case equal to zero. The incentive scheme breaks
down. The purchaser is better o⁄ without the incentive scheme.
Condition (ii) in Proposition 2 is su¢ cient. As Figure 1.b shows, even if there are
gains in quality 1 that can be obtained from an increase in price after quality 2 has hit
zero (i.e. even if dW=dpjp=p > 0), it may still be optimal to have no incentive scheme
and set psb = 0. This arises if the welfare when the two dimensions of quality are strictly
positive is higher than the welfare when the veri￿able quality 1 is set at the level where
marginal bene￿t equals marginal disutility while the non-veri￿able quality 2 is set equal
to zero (the minimum enforceable level).
[Figure 1.a and 1.b]









2 +mq1q2 (see section 4 for details). In Figure
1.a and 1.b we assume a1 = a2 = b1 = b2 = ￿1 = ￿2 = 1. For Figure 1.a we set ￿ = 0:5 and m = 0:5. For
Figure 1.b we set ￿ = 0:25 and m = 0:5.
11The following Proposition 2 establishes conditions that ensure psb = p￿; where p￿ is
the price derived in Eq.(10) when q2 is strictly positive (i.e. the constraint q2 ￿ 0 is not
binding).
Proposition 2 Suppose that: (i) quality 1 and 2 are substitutes; (ii) Bq1(p = 0) ￿
Bq2(p = 0); (iii) dW(q1(p);q2(p) = 0)=dpjp=p < 0. Then, dW(p = 0)=dp > 0 and the
optimal price is below the marginal bene￿t of quality 1:









The incentive scheme is low powered.
Proof. Appendix. ￿
Proposition 2 suggests that when conditions (i-iii) are met, then the optimal incentive
scheme is low-powered and the price is below the marginal bene￿t of quality dimension
1. Condition ii) requires that if no incentive scheme is introduced (i.e. p = 0), then the
marginal bene￿t from quality dimension 1 is higher than the marginal bene￿t from quality
dimension 2 (quality 1 matters more to the patients than quality 2). Condition iii) says
that at p = p, the price required to bring quality 2 to zero, the marginal gain from quality
1 is below its marginal disutility. In other words, at p = p an additional increase in price
and in quality 1 would reduce welfare.
This case resembles situations where quality dimension 1 is relatively more important
for the purchaser but has a negative impact on the other quality dimension. In these cases,
the price is positive but low-powered since a too high price will crowd-out valuable quality
on the non-veri￿able task.
Figure 2.a shows the solution. Again the solid line shows the welfare when both quality
dimensions are allowed to vary. The dotted line shows the welfare when quality 2 is set
to zero. The two lines cross at p = p; where quality 2 is equal to zero in both welfare
functions. Note that for p > p quality 2 is negative along the solid line while it is positive
when p < p. Therefore, the relevant welfare is the solid line for p < p and the dotted line
12for p ￿ p. Since welfare is decreasing for p ￿ p along the dotted line, it is straightforward
that the welfare-maximising price is psb = p￿.
Conditions i-iii) in Proposition 2 are su¢ cient but not necessary for psb = p￿. Instead
of the su¢ cient conditions i-ii), a necessary but not su¢ cient condition for Proposition









condition can hold even when the marginal bene￿t from quality 1 is smaller than the
marginal bene￿t from quality 2 as long as the degree of substitutability between the two
quality dimensions is su¢ ciently small. The condition guarantees that the introduction
of a price is welfare improving, dW=dp(p = 0) > 0, and that p￿ > 0. However, it does
not establish whether p￿ generates the maximum welfare. Whether it does it depends on
how the welfare function varies with p for p > p: If dW=dpjp=p < 0 (the marginal welfare
from an increase in quality 1 is negative when quality 2 hits zero), then p￿ is certainly a
maximum, as Figure 2.a has shown. However, this is again a su¢ cient condition. Figure
2.b shows the case where dW=dpjp=p > 0 (the marginal welfare from an increase in quality
1 is positive when quality 2 hits zero) but psb = p￿ is still a maximum. In Figure 2.b, the







[Figure 2.a and 2.b]
If the optimal price psb = p￿ is positive, then the FOC can be rewritten as:
[(1 + ￿)Bq1 ￿ ￿q1](@q1=@p) = [(1 + ￿)Bq2 ￿ ￿q2](￿@q2=@p) (13)
The optimal price is such that the marginal welfare gain from an increase in quality
dimension 1 is equal to the marginal welfare loss from a reduction in quality dimension 2.







6In Figure 2.a and 2.b we assume a1 = b1 = ￿1 = ￿2 = 1, a2 = 2; b2 = 0 and m = 0:5. For Figure 2.a
we set ￿ = 0:2; while ￿ = 0:1 for Figure 2.b.
13where ￿W
qi = @W=@qi(qi=W) denotes the elasticity of welfare with respect to quality di-
mension i and ￿
qi
p = @qi=@p(p=qi) the elasticity of quality i with respect to price. The
optimal price is such that the product of the elasticity of welfare with respect to quality
and the elasticity of quality with respect to price are equal for each quality dimension.7
The following two propositions establish conditions for having high-powered incentive
schemes. Proposition 3 shows that the optimal incentive scheme can be high powered even
though the two quality dimensions are substitutes.
Proposition 3 Suppose that : (i) quality 1 and 2 are substitutes;
(ii) dW(q1(p);q2(p) = 0)=dpjp=p > 0; (iii) W(e p) > W(p￿) or W(e p) > W(p = 0). Then,
psb = e p = Bq1: The incentive scheme is high powered.
Proof. Appendix. ￿
Condition ii) ensures that, once quality 2 hits zero, welfare increases with price for
p > p up to price p = e p. In words, when quality 2 is driven to zero, a marginal increase
in price p is such that the marginal bene￿t from quality 1 is bigger than its marginal
disutility. This might be the case when the level of altruism is su¢ ciently low, so that
quality 2 quickly drops to zero when price increases. Condition iii) guarantees that p = e p
is the global maximum. The purchaser is better o⁄when quality 2 is equal to zero, quality
1 is high and the price is equal to the marginal bene￿t of quality 1, compared to a scenario
where both quality dimensions are positive but low, and the price is set below the marginal
bene￿t of quality 1.
Figures 3.a-3.c show three possible scenarios. In Figure 3.a we have dW(p = 0)=dp < 0.
In this case an increase in the price reduces welfare for low p because it reduces a lot
quality 2. However, reached price p = p, the level of quality 2 is zero and therefore given
assumption ii) welfare increases after that up to price p = e p. Condition (iii) guarantees
that p = e p is the global maximum.
In Figure 3.b we have dW(p = 0)=dp > 0. There is a local maximum at p = p￿. Once
reached price p = p, the level of quality 2 is zero and therefore given our assumption in









14(ii) welfare increases after that up to price p = e p. Condition (iii) guarantees that p = e p is
the global maximum. In Figure 3.a and 3.b it is always the case that p￿ < p < e p. Figure
3.c provides an example where p < p￿ < e p.8
[Figure 3.a, 3.b, and 3.c]
Finally, our next proposition provides the optimal incentive scheme when the two qual-
ity dimensions are complements in the provider￿ s disutility or patients￿bene￿t function.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the two quality dimensions are complements. Then,









The incentive scheme is high powered.
Proof. Appendix. ￿
Since the two quality dimensions are complements, the introduction of a positive price
increases not only quality 1 but also quality 2. Therefore, in this case the introduction
of the price is always welfare improving. However, there is still an issue on how high the
price should be set.
Proposition 4 suggests that the optimal price is set above the marginal bene￿t of
quality dimension 1. In this case we do not need to worry about the constraint q2 ￿ 0,
because it is always satis￿ed with strict inequality. This is because dq2=dp > 0.
The optimal price is such that
[(1 + ￿)Bq2 ￿ ￿q2](@q2=@p) = ￿[(1 + ￿)Bq1 ￿ ￿q1](@q1=@p): (16)
In equilibrium the marginal welfare gain from an increase in quality 2 is equal to the
marginal welfare loss from an increase in quality 1. In this case, the price is set at such
8In Figure 3.a -3.c we assume a1 = b1 = ￿1 = ￿2 = 1, and m = 0:5. For Figure 3.a we set a2 = 1:2;
b2 = 0; ￿ = 0:05; for Figure 3.b a2 = b2 = 1; ￿ = 0:2; and in Figure 3.c a2 = b2 = 1; and ￿ = 0:1:
15a high level that the marginal bene￿t from quality 1 is lower than its marginal disutility
((1 + ￿)Bq1 < ￿q1). It is also the case that the marginal bene￿t of quality 2 is above its
marginal disutility ((1 + ￿)Bq2 > ￿q2).
Recall from De￿nition 1 that the two quality dimensions might be complements even
when the two quality dimensions are substitutes in the provider￿ s disutility function (if
quality dimensions are complements in patients￿bene￿t and the degree of complementarity
is su¢ ciently strong). The empirical results from Sutton et al. (2008) indicate that the
complementarity e⁄ects between veri￿able and non-veri￿able quality may be strong. We
thus believe that the relevance of this proposition should not be underestimated.
3 Comparative statics
In this section we provide some comparative-statics results in the case where bene￿t and
disutility functions are quadratic. The point we want to make is that even in this simple
case the interaction between the quality dimensions in patients￿bene￿ts and provider￿ s
disutility make the comparative-statics results quite complex.
Suppose that B(q1;q2) = a1q1 ￿ (b1=2)q2
1 + a2q2 ￿ (b2=2)q2
2 and ￿(q1;q2) = (￿1=2)q2
1 +
(￿2=2)q2
2 +mq1q2, so there are no interaction e⁄ects in bene￿ts. By solving the provider￿ s
First Order Conditions (equation (2) and (3)) for the quality levels we obtain:
q￿
1(p) =
(p + ￿a1)(￿2 + ￿b2) ￿ m￿a2
￿1￿2 + ￿b1￿2 + ￿b2￿1 + ￿2b1b2 ￿ m2 (17)
q￿
2(p) =
￿a2 (￿1 + ￿b1) ￿ m(p + ￿a1)
￿1￿2 + ￿b1￿2 + ￿b2￿1 ￿ m2 + ￿2b1b2
Then, the optimal price is (follows from equation (10)):




First, we consider the case when the marginal bene￿t is constant. In this case the
optimal price is decreasing (increasing) in ￿q1q2 = m > 0 (< 0): That is, it is decreasing
16(increasing) in m when the two quality dimensions are substitutes (complements) in the
provider￿ s disutility function. Then we show that if marginal bene￿ts are decreasing, the
optimal price can be increasing in ￿q1q2 = m even in the case where the quality dimensions
are substitutes in the provider￿ s disutility function, i.e. when m > 0:
3.1 Constant marginal bene￿t
Suppose that the marginal bene￿t is constant (b1 = b2 = 0). Then the optimal price is




The optimal price psb is increasing in the marginal bene￿t of quality 1 and decreasing in
the marginal bene￿t of quality 2. The price is decreasing in m, as expected: the more the
two quality dimensions are substitutes, the smaller is the price (@p=@m < 0).
The higher the marginal disutility of dimension 2 the higher is the price (@p=@￿2 =
a2m=￿2
2 > 0). This is somewhat counter-intuitive, but follows from the fact that an
increase in the marginal disutility of quality 2 reduces quality 2 and thus the marginal
disutility of quality 1, which ultimately increases the level of quality 1.
Finally, notice that price does not vary with altruism (since marginal bene￿ts are
constant) nor with the marginal disutility of quality 1 (as price is equal to marginal
bene￿t). Note that the above results also hold for small b1 and b2 (i.e. for b1 ! 0 and
b2 ! 0).
Substituting the optimal price into the FOCs of the provider, we obtain
q￿
1 =
(1 + ￿)(a1￿2 ￿ ma2)
￿1￿2 ￿ m2 ; q￿
2 =
￿(a2￿1 ￿ ma1) ￿ m
￿2(a1￿2 ￿ ma2)
￿1￿2 ￿ m2 : (20)
The following corollary establishes how the optimal levels of quality vary with the di⁄erent
parameters.
Corollary 1 Suppose p￿ > 0. (a) @q￿
i =@m ? 0 with i = 1;2; (b) @q￿
i =@ai > 0 with
i = 1;2; (c) @q￿
i =@aj < 0 with j = 1;2 and i 6= j; (d) @q￿
i =@￿i < 0 with i = 1;2; (e)
17@q￿
i =@￿j > 0 with j = 1;2 and i 6= j; (f) @q￿
i =@￿ > 0 with i = 1;2; .
Proof. Appendix. ￿
To understand these results notice that the e⁄ect of each parameter on quality re￿ ects
the sum of the direct e⁄ect on quality plus the indirect e⁄ect through the price (see
equation (17)). In most cases the indirect e⁄ect reinforces the direct e⁄ect and the results
are unambiguous. For example, each quality level is decreasing in the marginal bene￿t
of the other quality dimension (@q￿
i =@aj < 0; i = j = 1;2 and i 6= j). An increase in
a1 decreases q￿
2 for two reasons: for a given price, a higher marginal bene￿t of quality 1
decreases quality 2 but also implies a higher price which also decreases quality 2 (case c).
In case (a) however, the direct and indirect e⁄ect counteract.9 A higher m implies a
more negative spillover e⁄ect of a high level of q1 on the marginal disutility of providing
quality 2. This e⁄ect tends to reduce quality 1. However, a higher m also implies a
tendency to reduce q2 : this e⁄ect tends to increase q1. Which e⁄ect dominates depends
on the relative size of the marginal disutility of producing q1 and q2, and the relative
marginal bene￿ts (a1 and a2). If the relative bene￿ts favour quality dimension 1 (a1 large
relative to a2; and large relative to marginal disutility) then q1 tends to increase with
m; while q2 tends to decrease with m: A similar result occurs if the marginal disutility of
providing q1 is relatively small to the marginal disutility of providing q2 (and the di⁄erence
in marginal bene￿ts is small).
We now comment brie￿ y on the other cases.
(b) Each quality level is increasing in its marginal bene￿ts (@q￿
i =@ai > 0, i = 1;2): a
higher marginal bene￿t from quality implies a higher price but also a stronger altruistic
component for the provider. Both e⁄ects induce higher quality in equilibrium.
(d) Each quality level is also decreasing in its own marginal disutility, i.e. @q￿
i =@￿i < 0;
i = 1;2. A higher marginal disutility for quality 1, ￿1, decreases quality 1 (direct e⁄ect)
and has no e⁄ect on price (follows from equation (19)). A higher marginal disutility for
quality 2, ￿2, decreases quality 2 (direct e⁄ect). In this case there is also an indirect e⁄ect
9The e⁄ects of an increase in m is symmetric so we only consider the e⁄ect on q1.
18via the price; an increase in ￿2 increases the price which further decreases quality 2.
(e) Each quality level is increasing in the marginal disutility of the other quality di-
mension. A higher marginal disutility for quality 2, ￿2, reduces the optimal quality 2 and
therefore reduces the marginal disutility of quality 1 which increases quality 1; moreover it
implies a higher price which also increases quality 1. Similarly, a higher marginal disutility
of quality 1, ￿1, reduces the optimal quality 1 and therefore reduces the marginal disutility
of quality 2 which increases quality 2 (there is no e⁄ect through the price).
(f) Higher altruism increases the marginal bene￿t of quality and therefore increases
quality (direct e⁄ect) and has no e⁄ect on the price (due to the assumption of constant
marginal bene￿t).
3.2 Decreasing marginal bene￿t
We now consider the case with decreasing marginal bene￿t. The point we want to make
is that the e⁄ects of an increase in the degree of substitutability in the disutility function,
￿q1q2 = m; are quite complicated and most often indeterminate when the marginal bene￿t
is decreasing. For example, it might indeed be the case that the price is actually increasing
in m. This happens when marginal bene￿ts decrease su¢ ciently fast.
The optimal price is now given by:



















































19If b1 = b2 = 0 we obtain as a special case the previous result, so that dpsb=dm < 0.
To show that the optimal price can increase in m > 0 when the marginal bene￿t
decreases su¢ ciently fast, let ￿ = 0:8; a1 = a2 = b1 = b2 = 2; and let ￿1 = ￿2 = 1: Figure
4 shows that dpsb=dm > 0 for some values of m > 0:10
To see why this result may arise, consider the case where the marginal bene￿t of quality
2 is constant, and the marginal bene￿t of quality 1 is decreasing (i.e., b2 = 0; and b1 > 0).
Moreover, suppose that @q1=@m < 0, i.e. higher substitutability reduces the veri￿able
quality (recall that in general @q1=@m is indeterminate even when marginal bene￿t is
constant). Then, since the marginal bene￿t of quality 1 is decreasing, the purchaser reacts
to the lower veri￿able quality by adjusting upwards the price. If this e⁄ect is su¢ ciently
strong then dpsb=dm > 0.
[Figure 4]
4 Comparison with First Best
In this section we ￿rst de￿ne the ￿rst best solution and then compare the results obtained
in Propositions 1-4, which we refer to as the second-best solution, with the ￿rst-best
solution. Our main result below is that if the marginal bene￿t of quality is constant,
then the price under the ￿rst-best solution will be higher than in the second best if the
two quality dimensions are substitutes, as we might intuitively expect. Furthermore, if
patients￿bene￿t is symmetric in both quality dimensions, then both aggregate quality and
patients￿bene￿t are higher in ￿rst best.
4.1 First best
We de￿ne the ￿rst-best solution a setting where the purchaser can observe both quality
dimensions and maximize over the quality levels directly. This is equivalent to set two
di⁄erent prices p1 and p2 for q1 and q2 respectively.
10With these parameter values q1 > 0;q2 > 0; and the SOC is full￿led.
20The purchaser maximises the di⁄erence between patients￿bene￿t and the transfers to
the provider B(q1;q2) ￿ T ￿ p1q1 ￿ p2q2 subject to the participation constraint: U ￿ 0 or




W = (1 + ￿)B(q1(p1);q2(p2)) ￿ ￿(q1(p1);q2(p2)) (24)
subject to the incentive-compatibility (IC) constraints (which follow from the provider￿ s
First Order Conditions):
p1 + ￿Bq1(q1;q2) ￿ ￿q1(q1;q2) ￿ 0; q1 ￿ 0 (25)
p2 + ￿Bq2(q1;q2) ￿ ￿q2(q1;q2) ￿ 0; q2 ￿ 0: (26)
The First Order Conditions with respect to price are:
dW(q1(p1);q2(p2))
dp1
= [(1 + ￿)Bq1 ￿ ￿q1](@q1=@p1) = 0 (27)
dW(q1(p1);q2(p2))
dp2
= [(1 + ￿)Bq2 ￿ ￿q2](@q2=@p2) = 0 (28)











; i = 1;2 (29)
q
fb
i : (1 + ￿)Bqi = ￿qi; i = 1;2: (30)
Hence, the price of each quality dimension is set equal to the marginal bene￿t this dimen-
sion generates. Furthermore, the optimal level of quality is such that the marginal bene￿t
of quality (weighted for the altruistic component) is equal to the marginal disutility.
4.2 Comparison of ￿rst best and second best
We start by comparing prices of quality dimension 1. However since both the marginal
bene￿t and the marginal disutility of quality 1 depends on the level of quality 2 we are
21not able to compare prices and quality levels without making further assumptions. To
compare prices we assume that marginal bene￿t of quality dimension 1 is constant, and
that marginal bene￿t of quality 1 is independent of quality 2. The following corollary
compares solutions.
Corollary 2 Suppose the marginal bene￿t is constant, Bq1q1 = Bq1q2 = 0: i) If the condi-
tions in Propositions 1-2 hold then p
fb
1 > psb. ii) If the conditions in Proposition 3 hold
then p
fb




The Corollary shows that the second-best price coincides with ￿rst-best price only
when quality 2 is zero in the second best. However, the real allocations, i.e. the choice of




which implies that welfare will di⁄er in ￿rst- and second-best solution. We now turn to
comparing the level of quality under the two settings.
Comparing the levels of quality is not straightforward. The problem is that even if we
can rank the prices for quality 1, the marginal disutility of quality 1 depends on the level
of quality 2. To compare the levels of quality we impose the following restrictions. First,
we assume that marginal bene￿t is constant and that the bene￿t function is symmetric,
Bq1q1 = Bq2q2 = Bq1q2 = 0, so that Bq1 = Bq2 = B: Second, let the disutility function be
symmetric, ￿q1q1 = ￿q2q2: (For simplicity) let the third-order derivatives on disutility be
zero so ￿qiqi = ￿ > ￿qiqj = m > 0; where the inequality follows from the second-order
conditions of the provider￿ s maximization problem.11
Under these assumptions it follows from equation (29) and (30) that prices and quality
for both tasks are identical in the ￿rst best. Furthermore, it follows from the provider￿ s
￿rst-order conditions (equation (2) and (3)) that ￿qsb
1 (qsb
1 ;qsb
2 ) > ￿qsb
2 (qsb
1 ;qsb
2 ) if and only
if psb > 0: The following lemma compares quality levels in second best.










￿ = ￿q1q1￿q2q2 ￿
￿
￿q1q2
￿2 > 0 from SOCs. Hence
￿qiqi > ￿qiqj:
22Lemma 1 Let i) Bq1q2 = Bq1q1 = Bq2q2 = 0; ii) Bq1 = Bq2; and iii) ￿q1q1 = ￿q2q2: If
psb > 0; then ￿qsb
1 (qsb
1 ;qsb
2 ) > ￿qsb
2 (qsb
1 ;qsb




Hence, when the disutility function and bene￿t function are symmetric in the two
quality dimensions, quality for the veri￿able dimension is higher than for non-veri￿able
dimension if the second best price is strictly positive.
Since the marginal bene￿t is constant and the bene￿t function is symmetric, marginal
bene￿t is equal for both quality dimensions both in ￿rst and second best. Hence we are
able to compare the marginal disutility in ￿rst best and second best. From the ￿rst order

















where ￿ = ￿q1q2=￿q1q1 > 0: We thus obtain the following ranking of marginal disutility








Obviously, the conditions given in (32) holds for qfb > qsb
1 > qsb
2 : The following proposition
gives an upper boundary for qsb
2 in the case where qfb < qsb
1 :
Proposition 5 Suppose the conditions in Lemma 1 hold and qsb
1 > qsb
2 : If qfb < qsb
1 then
i) qsb






< qfb; ii) qsb
1 + qsb












Hence, if quality 1 is higher in the second best than in the ￿rst best, qfb < qsb
1 , then
quality 2 is lower in the second best compared to the ￿rst best, qsb
2 < qfb. Furthermore,
aggregate quality and patients￿bene￿t is lower in the second best compared with the ￿rst
best.
235 Discussion
We now comment upon two of the assumptions we have imposed. The ￿rst one is that
provider costs are measured in disutility, and not in monetary costs; the second is that
both veri￿able and non-veri￿able quality are one-dimentional.
In the analysis presented in sections 2-4 we have assumed that providers costs are
non-monetary, i.e. that increasing quality in each dimension raises the disutility of the
provider. The main hints from our analysis also hold if we reinterpret costs as monetary.
However, if costs are monetary, a limited-liability constraint needs to be added to the
problem of the purchaser in addition to the participation constraint. Limited liability
implies that the provider cannot make losses. To make the point more clearly, suppose
that instead of the disutility function ￿(q1;q2), we assume that all costs are monetary
and are captured by the function C(q1;q2), with Cqi > 0, Cqiqi > 0, Cqiqj > 0 if quality
dimensions are substitutes, and Cqiqj < 0 if quality dimensions are complements. Since
the limited-liability constraint is binding, while the participation constraint is not for any
positive level of altruism, the purchaser maximises W = B(q1(p);q2(p)) ￿ C(q1(p);q2(p))
subject to the usual incentive-compatibility constraints. If both quality dimensions are
non-negative, the optimal price is now given by: p￿ = (Bq1 + Bq2
@q2=@p
@q1=@p)(1 ￿ ￿). The
optimal price now depends also directly on the degree of altruism, with higher altruism
implying a lower price. However, the qualitative features of the optimal price remain
unchanged.
In this paper we have assumed that both the veri￿able and non-veri￿able quality
is one-dimensional. This will typically not be the case. For example the contract for
UK general practices introduced in 2004 rewarded practices according to performance
on 146 indicators. Clearly, also non-veri￿able quality will typically be multidimensional.
One way to capture this in the model is to assume that q1 = (q11;q21;;:::;qn1) is an n-
dimensional vector of quality, pq1 = !1q11+!2q21+:::+!nqn is the scalar product, and !i;
i = 1;:::n is the weight given to quality dimension i: 12 Similarly, q2 = (q12;q22;;:::;qm2) is
12The weights correspond to the value of the points given in the UK-GP contract (Doran et al, 2006).
24an m-dimensional vector of non-veri￿able quality. By solving the provider￿ s maximisation
problem, and using the implicit-function theorem we obtain the comparative statics results
that determine if the vectors of quality dimensions are complements or substitutes. What
matters is not how each element of the veri￿able quality vector relates to one other element
of the non-veri￿able vector, but the overall interaction e⁄ect.
6 Conclusions
Purchasers make increased use of pay-for-performance incentive schemes in the attempt of
fostering quality in the health care sector. However, inevitably some dimensions of quality
remain not veri￿able. Existing incentive schemes have been criticised on the ground that
paying for quality will increase quality in the dimensions that are veri￿able but will reduce
quality for the dimensions that are not veri￿able (Roland, 2004; Whalley et al., 2005). This
criticism then raises the question whether such incentive schemes should be introduced,
and if introduced how powered should be the incentive schemes.
We show that in some cases low powered incentive schemes are optimal. Introducing
the scheme is useful in increasing welfare when the quality that is veri￿able is relatively
important. However, this needs to be traded-o⁄ with the reductions in the quality di-
mension that is not veri￿able. In other cases it is optimal not to introduce an incentive
scheme. This is likely to be the case when the quality dimensions that are not veri￿able
are relatively more important.
Finally, there are some cases where the optimal incentive scheme is high powered. This
arises in two circumstances. First, if the quality dimension that is not veri￿able falls to
zero quickly with price (due for example to low altruism), the bene￿t from increasing the
quality in the dimensions that are veri￿able can be quite large. Second, if the di⁄erent
quality dimensions face some complementarity, then providers become better at providing
also the dimensions of quality that are not veri￿able, when induced to increase the quality
dimensions that are veri￿able.
The incentive schemes that have been recently implemented in the US and the UK,
25suggest that these schemes are reasonably high powered. Our model suggest that this
policy is optimal when one of these conditions hold: i) quality dimensions are independent
so that an increase in one does not come at the cost of the other; ii) there are some
elements of substitutability and complementarity: for example it could be that they are
substitutes on costs but they are complements on patients￿bene￿ts (i.e. the marginal
bene￿t from the non-veri￿able quality increases when the veri￿able one is increased); iii)
the non-veri￿able quality is perceived by the purchaser to be so low, that the marginal
gains from an increase in the veri￿able quality overcome the losses from a reduction in the
non-veri￿able one.
Epstein (2006) argues that policy changes might lead to unexpected consequences, such
as higher payments to physicians and increased budget de￿cits. In the model outlined
in this paper providers￿ utility is the same (since the purchaser adjust the lump-sum
payments so that the provider￿ s participation constraint holds with equality). However,
the total payments will change when paying for performance is introduced. This follows
since the provided levels of quality are (weakly) higher under a regime of paying for
performance. Note that this will be an intended e⁄ect. In some cases the introduction of
paying for performance programs are not matched with a decrease in lump-sum payments,
and provider payments might increase unintentionally. The introduction of the paying for
performance program for UK family practitioners in 2004 might be such an example since
it increased the gross income of the family practitioners by about 20% (Doran et al.,
2006). We believe that a generous performance scheme will reduce resistance against
P4P-programs, and hence facilitate their introduction. In the long run we would however
expect payments to be adjusted to counteract the unintended consequences observed at
the time paying-for-performance schemes are introduced.
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288 Appendix
In this appendix we provide details regarding some of the calculations in this paper.
The Second Order Conditions (SOCs) of the provider￿ s problem are:












A su¢ cient but not necessary condition for Uq1q1Uq2q2 ￿ U2
q2q1 > 0 to be satis￿ed is
￿q1q1￿q2q2 > ￿2
q1q2 and Bq1q1Bq2q2 > B2
q1q2.
To ￿nd the e⁄ects @qi=@p; i = 1;2 we use Cramer￿ s rule. De￿ne
F1 (q1;q2;p;￿) ￿ p + ￿Bq1(q1;q2) ￿ ￿q1(q1;q2) = 0
F2 (q1;q2;p;￿) ￿ ￿Bq2(q1;q2) ￿ ￿q2(q1;q2) = 0:






￿Bq1q1 ￿ ￿q1q1 ￿Bq1q2 ￿ ￿q1q2





= Uq1q1Uq2q2 ￿ U2
q2q1 > 0;
where the last inequality follows from the assumption that the SOC is satis￿ed.
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￿Bq1q1 ￿ ￿q1q1 ￿1











29The SOC of the sponsor￿ s problem is satis￿ed and the problem is well behaved since
d2W
dp2 = [(1 + ￿)Bq1q1 ￿ ￿q1q1](@q1=@p)
2 + [(1 + ￿)Bq2q2 ￿ ￿q2q2](@q2=@p)
2 < 0:






= [(1+￿)Bq1 ￿￿q1](@q1=@p)+[(1+￿)Bq2 ￿












































which is negative when the necessary condition (i) in Proposition 1 is satis￿ed. ￿





















Therefore, at p = 0 the condition is positive when (i) and (ii) in Proposition 2 are
satis￿ed. ￿






= [(1+￿)Bq1 ￿￿q1](@q1=@p). Using the






= (Bq1 ￿ p)(@q1=@p) = 0, which implies
e p = Bq1. ￿
Proof of Proposition 4. In this case the quality dimension 2 is always strictly positive,
q2 > 0 and therefore p = e p cannot be in equilibrium. The solution is given by p￿. ￿
30Proof of Corollary 1.





￿2 (1 + ￿)
h








= (1 + ￿)





















































































2 (￿1￿2 ￿ m2)
￿ ￿1
￿
￿(a2￿1 ￿ ma1) ￿ m




















m(1 + ￿)(a2￿1 ￿ ma1)
(￿1￿2 ￿ m2)





















￿1￿2 ￿ m2 > 0
￿
31Proof of Corollary 2. Obviously, when the price in second best is zero (Proposition
1), the ￿rst best price is higher. To prove the ￿rst statement i), recall that p
fb
1 = Bq1;








. Note that since Bq1q1 =











1 > psb. The second statement ii) follows since psb = e p = Bq1 when the conditions in
Proposition 3 holds. The proof of the last statement iii) follows along similar lines as the
￿rst statement but now ￿q1q2 < 0: ￿
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose q1 = q2 = q: Then ￿q1 = ￿q2 = K (by symmetry of the
cost function). Let ￿ > 0: Then (starting in a symmetric situation)
K1 ￿ ￿q1(q + ￿;q) ￿ K + ￿￿ > K + m￿ ￿ ￿q2(q + ￿;q) ￿ K2:
Now, let q1 = q + ￿ > q2 (starting in an asymmetric situation).
￿q1(q1 + ￿;q2) ￿ K1 + ￿￿ > K2 + m￿ ￿ ￿q2(q1 + ￿;q2):
Since ￿ can be chosen arbitrarily small the approximation should hold. Furthermore,
symmetry ensures that ￿q1 ￿ ￿q2 () q2 ￿ q1: ￿
Proof of Proposition 5. We have























Hence, if qfb < qsb
1 ; then quality along the second dimension cannot be too high.
The second statement follows since qfb ￿ qsb











































p p p p
W W
 p p∗  0 p∗  0
Case 1. Incentive scheme breaks down

























p p  p
Figure 2a
W W







































Case 3: High-powered incentive scheme
36Figure 4. Optimal price may increase in m
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